Bankenregulierung: So komplex wie nötig, so einfach wie möglich. Bankenaufsicht: So komplex wie nötig, so einfach wie möglich. Diese Anforderungen beziehen sich auf das Kapitalregime und auf das Abwicklungsregime. Das Kapitalregime regelt die Menge und Art der Eigenmittel, die eine Bank auf going-concern-Basis halten muss. Ziel ist es, die Solvenz und Stabilität der Bank in ihrem täglichen Geschäftsbetrieb zu gewährleisten und Verluste aus laufenden Geschäften abzufedern. Das Kapitalregime umfasst vier wesentliche Kapitalanforderungen, von denen drei risikogewichtet sind und eine ungewichtet ist. Risikogewichtet bedeutet, dass Vermögenswerte je nach ihrem Risikogehalt unterschiedlich gewichtet werden. Ein besichertes Darlehen an einen zuverlässigen Schuldner erhält daher ein geringeres Risikogewicht als ein unbesichertes Darlehen an einen riskanten Schuldner. Die Gewichtung dient dazu, das Kreditrisiko genauer zu erfassen. Banken müssen drei Anforderungen an ihre risikogewichteten Vermögenswerte erfüllen – für Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, Additional Tier 1 Capital und Total Own Funds. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital umfasst beispielsweise vom Institut ausgegebene Aktien oder einbehaltene Gewinne. Diese Form des Kapitals ist am besten geeignet, Verluste aufzufangen. Nachrangige Verbindlichkeiten gehören hauptsächlich zum Tier 2 Capital. Banken müssen auch eine Leverage Ratio einhalten. Dies bedeutet vereinfacht ausgedrückt, dass das Tier 1 Capital im Verhältnis zu den Gesamtaktiva gemessen wird – ohne Risikogewichtung. Die Leverage Ratio begrenzt die Verschuldung von Banken und bietet eine zusätzliche Schutzschicht neben den risikogewichteten Kapitalanforderungen. Wenn eine Bank abgewickelt wird – d.h. im Falle eines «gone concern» – enthält das Abwicklungsregime weitere Anforderungen. Ziel ist es, auch Banken, deren Insolvenz die Finanzstabilität gefährden könnte, in geordneter Weise abzuwickeln, ohne die Steuerzahler zu belasten. Das Abwicklungsregime regelt dies in Europa. Die Mindestanforderung an Eigenmittel und haftfähige Verbindlichkeiten (MREL) ist ein Element davon. Um die Anforderungen des Abwicklungsregimes zu erfüllen, dürfen Banken nicht nur Eigenkapital, sondern auch bestimmte Instrumente des Fremdkapitals verwenden. Insgesamt müssen große Banken in Europa bis zu neun verschiedene Eigenkapitalanforderungen erfüllen. Wir haben verschiedene Anforderungen nebeneinander, so dass wir hier von horizontaler Komplexität sprechen. Darüber hinaus gibt es auch vertikale Komplexität, wobei diese Anforderungen wiederum aus mehreren gestaffelten Schichten bestehen. Wenn Ihr Kopf bereits in Gang gekommen ist, sind Sie nicht allein – viele Banken und Finanzinvestoren fühlen dasselbe. Die Komplexität wird problematisch, wenn sie zu Ineffizienzen führt oder wenn die einzelnen Elemente sich gegenseitig behindern. Ich möchte nun kurz auf zwei Hauptproblembereiche eingehen. Erstens erschwert die Vielzahl der Kapitalanforderungen Banken, Aufsichtsbehörden und Marktteilnehmer festzustellen, welche Anforderung in einem bestimmten Fall bindend ist. Zweitens gibt es eine Reihe von Nebenwirkungen und Interaktionen, die die tatsächlichen Ziele der Regeln untergraben können. Zum Beispiel führt das doppelte Zählen von Eigenmitteln zu Puffern und parallelen Mindestanforderungen dazu, dass die verfügbaren Puffer reduziert werden. Dies kann wiederum dazu führen, dass Aufsichtsbehörden Puffer freigeben, aber Banken sie tatsächlich nicht nutzen können. Dieses Problem ist bereits gut dokumentiert. Ein weiteres Beispiel ist, dass große Banken oft einige ihrer Anforderungen mit Additional Tier 1 Capital, wie etwa CoCo-Bonds, erfüllen. Dadurch haben sie weniger Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, um Verluste abzufedern. Krisenmaßnahmen haben unterschiedliche Auslösepunkte, und dieser Unterschied kann ebenfalls problematisch sein. Aus Sicht des Kapitalregimes wäre es sinnvoll, den Auslösepunkt so spät wie möglich zu setzen, um sicherzustellen, dass Banken auch ihre Puffer nutzen und die Kreditvergabe aufrechterhalten. Aus Sicht der Abwicklung könnte dies jedoch dazu führen, dass nicht genügend Kapital vorhanden ist, um eine geordnete Abwicklung zu ermöglichen. Wie Sie sehen können, führt komplexe Regulierung in einigen Fällen zu unerwünschten Nebenwirkungen, die den eigentlichen Zweck der Regulierung untergraben. Bankenregulierung: So komplex wie nötig, so einfach wie möglich. Bankenregulierung: So komplex wie nötig, so einfach wie möglich

Please note that the following speech is not verbatim and is subject to slight changes during delivery.

I am delighted to welcome you all to the thirteenth regulatory conference. I extend a warm welcome to our esteemed speakers and panelists.

To start off, I want to share a story from the world of medicine. In the 19th century, a simple rule introduced by a Hungarian physician, Ignaz Semmelweis, led to a significant decrease in mortality rates from infectious diseases. This story illustrates the power of simple solutions to complex problems.

Similarly, European banking regulation has evolved into a complex system with various objectives and instruments. While this complexity has made the banking system more resilient, it has also led to inefficiencies. Six months ago, my colleagues and I called for simplification in banking regulation to enhance efficiency.

Simplification in banking regulation does not mean deregulation. It aims to reduce unnecessary complexity while ensuring the stability of the banking system. One example of simplification is streamlining reporting requirements to eliminate overlaps and improve efficiency.

As we evaluate the current state of banking regulation, it is essential to consider what optimal regulation would look like if we were to start from scratch. Regular assessments and improvements are necessary to ensure effective regulation.

The complexity of European banking regulation is evident in own funds requirements. European banks face numerous parallel requirements, leading to challenges in compliance and implementation.

In conclusion, simplification in banking regulation is essential to enhance efficiency and effectiveness while maintaining the stability of the banking system. I will now outline four thought-provoking ideas on how we can simplify banking regulation for better outcomes. Thank you. These requirements are related to both the capital regime and the resolution regime. The capital regime dictates the amount and type of funds a bank must hold to ensure solvency and stability in day-to-day operations and to mitigate ongoing business losses.

The capital regime includes four key requirements, three of which are risk-weighted based on the assets’ risk content. Banks must meet requirements for common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, and total own funds. The leverage ratio also plays a role in measuring tier 1 capital in relation to total assets without risk weighting.

In the event of a bank being wound up, the resolution regime sets further requirements to ensure an orderly wind-up process without burdening taxpayers. This regime includes elements like minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC).

Large European banks must meet up to nine different own funds requirements, leading to horizontal and vertical complexity. Different layers of requirements, such as capital buffers and Pillar 2 guidance, add to this complexity.

The complexity of these regulations can lead to inefficiencies and challenges in determining which requirements are binding in specific cases. Interactions and side effects, like double counting of funds and conflicting trigger points, can undermine the rules’ objectives.

To address this complexity, reducing the number of own funds requirements could be a potential solution. Simplifying the capital regime to focus on common equity tier 1 capital only could streamline the process for banks in a going concern scenario. This would result in a single risk-weighted requirement and an unweighted requirement for common equity tier 1 capital.

For additional tier 1 capital, there have been concerns about its ability to absorb losses as intended in a going concern scenario. In times of crisis, additional tier 1 capital often only absorbs losses when a bank is close to failing. By focusing on common equity tier 1 capital instead, banks’ loss-absorbing capacity in normal operations would be strengthened without constraints or repayment requirements, making the capital regime clearer and simpler.

Another approach is to separate the capital and resolution regimes more distinctly. This would involve using only specific instruments in the resolution regime, such as additional tier 1 capital, tier 2 capital, and subordinated liabilities. By keeping these separate from common equity tier 1 capital, funds reserved for resolution would be protected from losses during normal operations. This separation would also prevent overlapping requirements and allow banks to use their capital buffers without violating minimum requirements.

Pooling various capital buffers is a third approach to simplify regulation without changing the division of tasks between European and national supervisory authorities. Combining countercyclical capital buffers and systemic risk buffers into a single releasable buffer could provide flexibility during stressful periods and support lending activities.

Introducing a small bank regime is the fourth approach, aiming to simplify capital requirements for smaller institutions. By aligning regulations with the principle of proportionality and potentially removing risk-weighted requirements for small banks, complexity could be reduced without compromising resilience.

In conclusion, these proposed measures have the potential to significantly reduce the complexity of European banking regulation while maintaining the stability of the banking system. Just as Semmelweis’ hand-washing measure revolutionized healthcare, simplification of banking regulation could lead to more efficient and effective oversight. Dies würde die Anforderungen an Eigenmittel halbieren. Zweitens könnten wir die Berechtigung im Abwicklungsregime auf Instrumente beschränken, die nicht zum Common Equity Tier 1 Capital gehören. Drittens könnten makroprudenzielle Kapitalpuffer kombiniert und so gestaltet werden, dass sie im Krisenfall leichter und flexibler freigesetzt werden können. Viertens könnten die Anforderungen für kleinere, risikoärmere Banken weiter vereinfacht werden. Anstatt komplexer, risikogewichteter Anforderungen wäre ein höherer, aber unkomplizierterer Leverage-Ratio vorzuziehen. Es ist klar, dass wir am Anfang einer langen Reise stehen. Die vier Ideen müssen analytisch weiter untermauert und auf mögliche Nebenwirkungen untersucht werden. Außerdem müssten viele Details sorgfältig definiert und gründlich erforscht werden. Mit dieser Rede möchte ich die Diskussion mit unseren nationalen und europäischen Partnern weiter vorantreiben. Denn ich bin überzeugt, dass wir diesen Weg mutig weitergehen sollten. Vereinfachung ist machbar – getreu dem Motto: so komplex wie nötig, so einfach wie möglich. Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit. Our main priority is to avoid any situation that could potentially put the stability of the banking system at risk or underestimate the dangers involved. Instead, we are focused on simplifying regulations by reducing unnecessary complexity. The goal is to make regulations clearer, more understandable, and more efficient while still ensuring the stability of the banking system. Our motto is to keep things as simple as possible, but as complex as necessary.

One area where we are actively pursuing simplification is in disclosure requirements and reporting standards. There are already initiatives at both the European and national levels to eliminate reporting overlaps and streamline requirements. For example, we are working with BaFin to discontinue reporting for loans of €1 million or more by the end of 2026, pending necessary legal amendments.

In banking regulation, there are many areas where simplification could be beneficial. The current regulations have evolved over time through various reforms in response to different crises and challenges, resulting in a complex web of rules. It is important to periodically evaluate and potentially simplify regulations, even if they are functioning well. This process is common in monetary policy and can also benefit banking regulation.

One specific example of complexity in European banking regulation is in own funds requirements. Banks must comply with various capital requirements for both day-to-day operations and resolution scenarios. These requirements include risk-weighted assets, common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, and total own funds, as well as a leverage ratio. The resolution regime adds further complexity, with requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities.

Overall, European banks face up to nine different own funds requirements, leading to both horizontal and vertical complexity. This complexity can be overwhelming for banks and investors. It is important to assess and potentially simplify these requirements to ensure a more efficient and effective regulatory framework. If complexity leads to inefficiencies or hinders the effectiveness of individual elements, it can become problematic. There are two key problem areas that I would like to highlight briefly.

First, the multitude of capital requirements can make it challenging for banks, supervisors, and market participants to determine which requirement is binding in a given situation. This is due to various factors such as the capital structure and available buffers.

Second, there are side effects and interactions that can undermine the intended objectives of the rules. For example, double counting of own funds towards buffers and parallel minimum requirements can reduce available buffers for use, leading to situations where banks cannot utilize released buffers. This issue is well-documented.

Another example is that large banks often meet requirements with contingent convertible bonds, resulting in less common equity tier 1 capital to cushion losses.

To address these complexities, I propose four possible areas of action:

1. Reduce the number of own funds requirements by focusing on common equity tier 1 capital.
2. Separate capital and resolution regimes more clearly to avoid overlapping requirements.
3. Pool capital buffers, such as combining countercyclical capital buffer and systemic risk buffer.
4. Introduce a small bank regime with simplified own funds requirements, inspired by approaches in Switzerland. En ese sentido, los pequeños bancos pueden optar voluntariamente por un régimen en el cual ya no se apliquen los requisitos ponderados por riesgo. Esto sería digno de consideración para los bancos pequeños, menos complejos y de bajo riesgo en la Unión Europea también. Esto eliminaría el cálculo y documentación de activos ponderados por riesgo, así como muchos requisitos de informes y divulgación. A cambio, la relación de apalancamiento, es decir, el requisito de capital de nivel 1 en relación con los activos no ponderados, se incrementaría en consecuencia. El nivel exacto de la relación de apalancamiento aún tendría que determinarse.

En resumen, la complejidad de los requisitos de capital de los bancos pequeños disminuiría significativamente, pero su resistencia seguiría intacta. Por lo tanto, aquí también, la simplificación no significa desregulación, sino una regulación más simple pero efectiva.

En conjunto, las medidas propuestas podrían reducir significativamente la complejidad de la regulación bancaria europea y disminuir los efectos secundarios no deseados. Todo esto sin poner en peligro la estabilidad del sistema bancario. Incluso podría aumentarla aún más.

En conclusión, al principio de mi discurso, mencioné al doctor Ignaz Semmelweis. Aunque su medida simple de lavado de manos fue un éxito rotundo, no fue acogida de inmediato por todos sus colegas. Sin embargo, la importancia de la higiene de manos finalmente prevaleció en todo el mundo y ahora se considera una de las medidas más importantes y simples para prevenir infecciones.

Y cuando se trata de reducir la complejidad de la regulación bancaria, todavía tenemos que hacer algunas persuasiones. Esto se debe a que a menudo se asume intuitivamente que un problema complejo como la estabilidad de los bancos solo se puede abordar con una regulación igualmente compleja. Pero si he podido convencerlos de algo hoy, espero que sea lo siguiente: vale la pena cuestionar críticamente la complejidad de nuestra regulación bancaria.

Reconocer el problema es en su mayoría bastante simple: encontrar la solución óptima, por el contrario, a menudo es mucho más difícil. Ya les he presentado varias ideas específicas hoy. Permítanme resumirlas brevemente nuevamente:

Primero, podríamos hacer que el capital de nivel 1 común sea el único capital elegible en el régimen de capital. Esto reduciría a la mitad el número de requisitos de fondos propios.

En segundo lugar, podríamos restringir la elegibilidad en el régimen de resolución a instrumentos que no pertenecen al capital de nivel 1 común. Los requisitos en el régimen de capital y resolución estarían claramente separados.

En tercer lugar, los colchones de capital macroprudenciales podrían combinarse y diseñarse de tal manera que puedan liberarse más fácil y flexiblemente en caso de crisis.

En cuarto lugar, los requisitos podrían simplificarse aún más para los bancos más pequeños y de bajo riesgo. En lugar de requisitos complicados ponderados por riesgo, sería preferible una relación de apalancamiento más alta pero menos complicada.

Una cosa está clara: Estamos al principio de un largo camino. Las cuatro ideas deben ser sustancialmente analizadas y examinadas en busca de posibles efectos secundarios. Además, muchos detalles deberían definirse cuidadosamente y explorarse a fondo.

Con este discurso, me gustaría avanzar aún más en la discusión con nuestros socios nacionales y europeos. Porque estoy convencido de que deberíamos avanzar audazmente en este camino. La simplificación es factible, fiel al lema: tan complejo como sea necesario, tan simple como sea posible. Gracias por su atención. I am suggesting that sometimes a simple solution is better than a complex one. Today’s European banking regulation is overly complex, with numerous intertwined measures and instruments aimed at achieving different objectives. While this has made the banking system more resilient, it has also made the regulations more convoluted.

I, along with my ECB colleagues, have called for simplification in banking regulation to make it clearer and more efficient without compromising stability. Simplification does not mean deregulation but rather reducing unnecessary complexity. For example, streamlining reporting requirements and harmonizing standards can be a step towards simplification.

The current own funds regulation in Europe is a good example of this complexity. European banks face multiple requirements regarding capital and resolution regimes, each with different objectives. The capital regime consists of various capital requirements, including risk-weighted assets, to ensure the solvency and stability of banks.

It’s important to evaluate and simplify banking regulation periodically to ensure its effectiveness. By reevaluating and potentially rewriting regulations from scratch, we can create optimal banking regulation that is clear, efficient, and still safeguards stability. CoCo bonds, short for contingent convertible bonds, are a key component of additional tier 1 capital as they convert from debt to equity automatically upon specific trigger events. Tier 2 capital, on the other hand, mainly consists of subordinated liabilities.

In addition to meeting a leverage ratio requirement, banks must adhere to various own funds regulations in Europe. These regulations include the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as part of the resolution regime. Banks are allowed to use equity capital and certain debt instruments to meet these requirements.

The complexity of multiple own funds requirements poses challenges for banks, supervisors, and market participants. This complexity can lead to inefficiencies and hinder the effectiveness of regulations. For instance, the multitude of requirements can make it difficult to determine which is binding in a given situation.

To address these challenges, reducing the number of own funds requirements and clearly separating capital and resolution regimes have been proposed as possible solutions. Streamlining regulations and ensuring that loss-absorbing instruments are appropriately utilized can help simplify the regulatory framework and enhance financial stability. The reason for this is that common equity tier 1 capital, despite offering the best loss-absorbing capacity, may be depleted in a resolution scenario due to double counting in the capital and resolution regimes. By separating the capital and resolution regimes, requirements would no longer overlap, allowing banks to use their capital buffers without violating minimum requirements.

Another advantage of separating the regimes is that it would simplify the resolution process by only allowing subordinated liabilities, rather than senior bonds, to cover requirements. This targeted approach would facilitate effective resolution without negative impacts on the financial system.

Pooling various capital buffers is a third approach that could streamline regulation without undermining the existing division of tasks between European and national supervisory authorities. Combining countercyclical capital buffers and systemic risk buffers into a single releasable buffer could provide flexibility during periods of stress, allowing banks to continue lending to businesses and households.

For small banks, a fourth approach suggests simplifying own funds requirements, similar to the principle of proportionality already applied in many areas. Taking inspiration from Switzerland, small banks could opt for a regime without risk-weighted requirements, reducing complexity while maintaining resilience.

In conclusion, these proposed measures have the potential to significantly reduce the complexity of European banking regulation without compromising stability. By critically questioning and simplifying existing regulations, we can enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory framework. Just as hand hygiene is a simple yet crucial measure for preventing infections, simplifying banking regulation could lead to a more robust and efficient financial system. Thank you for your attention. Please rewrite the following sentence:

«The dog ran quickly across the field, chasing after the ball.»

Rewritten sentence:

The ball was chased by the dog as it ran swiftly across the field.

QUELLEN